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Abstract
Objective: To enable privacy-preserving learning
of high quality generative and discriminative ma-
chine learning models from distributed electronic
health records.
Methods and Results: We describe general and
scalable strategy to build machine learning models in
a provably privacy-preserving way. Compared to the
standard approaches using, e.g., differential privacy,
our method does not require alteration of the input
biomedical data, works with completely or partially
distributed datasets, and is resilient as long as the
majority of the sites participating in data processing
are trusted to not collude. We show how the proposed
strategy can be applied on distributed medical records
to solve the variables assignment problem, the key
task in exact feature selection and Bayesian networks
learning.
Conclusions: Our proposed architecture can be
used by health care organizations, spanning providers,
insurers, researchers and computational service
providers, to build robust and high quality predic-
tive models in cases where distributed data has to be
combined without being disclosed, altered or other-
wise compromised.
1 Introduction
Machine Learning (ML) is well accepted for study-
ing and using biomedical data, with a promise of
personalized, predictive and preventive medicine.1,2
ML methods are increasingly integrated into modern
health informatics solutions, including clinical deci-
sion support systems,3 clinical trial design tools4 and
telemedicine platforms.5 However, to be reliable and
effective, these methods often require exact (i.e. glob-
ally optimal) algorithms, and significant amounts of
input data to learn from. This is challenging because
1Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University
at Buffalo
2Department of Biomedical Informatics, University at Buffalo
the volume and variety of the data that can be accu-
mulated in health records of a single institution, for
example a providers network, is intrinsically limited
(consider for example rare diseases6). At the same
time, in both clinical and research setups, sharing of
the biomedical data across institutional boundaries
is heavily guarded by privacy considerations, with
corresponding regulatory policies and guidelines, e.g.,
HIPAA in USA.7 Moreover, often times organizations
are simply unwilling to grant access to their data, due
to concerns about competitive advantage or liability.
Consequently, the available distributed data remains
vastly underutilized,8 as the interested parties struggle
to securely and effectively integrate it.
The common approach in such situations is to either
seek consent to release and share the data, anonymize
the data,9 or use some privacy-preserving techniques,
e.g., differential privacy.10 However, seeking consent
in many cases is impossible, especially for archival
data, and anonymization typically requires retaining
significant and valuable portions of the data. Con-
sequently, these approaches are neither scalable nor
sustainable. These issues are largely addressed by
differential privacy methods. However, because dif-
ferential privacy in its fabric involves data alteration,
e.g., by adding noise, it may not be suitable for appli-
cations where high quality models are desired.
Here we propose an alternative architecture for
privacy-preserving computations on distributed EHR
data, which is free of the above limitations. Our archi-
tecture does not require alteration of the input data,
is suitable for processing completely or partially dis-
tributed datasets, and is guaranteed to maintain data
privacy as long as the majority of the sites processing
the data are trusted to not collude. We demonstrate
how, without ever disclosing distributed EHR data
used in the underlying computations, this platform
can be used to execute variables assignment problem,
a key component to feature selection or to building
exact ML models such as Bayesian networks.
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Figure 1: Schematic representation of our proposed architecture for privacy-preserving computations.
2 Proposed Architecture
Our proposed architecture for privacy-preserving com-
putations is outlined in Figure 1. We divide all par-
ticipants into three groups: the data owners (DOs),
computational service providers (CSPs), and output
recipients (ORs). We put no constraints on how these
three groups are formed, and a single entity can be
involved in a protocol by assuming on one or more
of the above roles. The data owners (e.g., hospitals
A©, B©, and C©) locally pre-process their privately
held data and securely enter them into the compu-
tation. The computational service providers (e.g.,
entities C©, D©, E©) carry out the computation on
cryptographically-protected data, on behalf of other
participants. Upon completion of the computation,
they communicate cryptographically-protected result
of the computation to ORs (e.g., hospital C© and insur-
ance company F©), who locally reconstruct the output
and learn the result.
It is important to understand what it means to “se-
curely enter data into the computation” and to “carry
out the computation on cryptographically-protected
data.” Specifically, computing on cryptographically-
protected data means that no CSP can understand
or learn information about the data it receives and
uses in the computation. This is because all compu-
tation is carried out using semantically secure encryp-
tion, which does not allow observers to deduce any
patterns or other information about the encrypted
data. Yet, the encryption has special properties that
make it possible to compute directly on the protected
data. Similarly, securely entering private data into the
computation means that each DO first applies crypto-
graphic protection to its data, and then communicates
it to the appropriate CSPs, where each CSP cannot
remove the protection after receiving the data.
The above setup is flexible enough to naturally fit sev-
eral broad categories of collaborative and individual
computing needs. In particular, a number of parties
with a private input each can engage in secure function
evaluation themselves and learn the result (or their
respective results). Alternatively, they can choose a
subset of them, a number of outside parties, or a com-
bination of the above to carry out the computation,
while each data owner distributes their private data
to the parties who carry out the computation. An-
other very important scenario involves a single entity
outsourcing its computation to a number of computa-
tional service providers. In this case, that entity will
be the only data owner and output recipient and all
other parties learn nothing.
As we mentioned earlier, our key requirement is that
the CSPs learn nothing about the data they are pro-
cessing (i.e., there is a mathematical proof that it is
not possible). We also require that the ORs learn
nothing about the original data other than the out-
put of the agreed-upon computation that they receive.
Lastly, any DO who is not an OR must also learn
nothing. Note that it is possible to configure the
computation in such a way that ORs learn different
output from the computation, but it still must hold
that no additional information is available to the ORs.
These security notions can be rigorously specified
using formal definitions from cryptography (see for
example11), however, providing such definitions and
the corresponding security proofs is beyond the scope
of this article.
Because proper protection of the private data through-
out the computation is our primary goal, it is impor-
tant to spell out the assumptions with respect to this
setup to ensure that no information leakage is pos-
sible. In a setup with multiple CSPs, it is assumed
that a fraction of them will be honest and will not
conspire with other CSPs in an attempt to learn unau-
thorized information about the data. That is, some
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CSPs can be corrupt and colluding, but there should
be a sufficient number of other CSPs who are not. If
we denote the total number of CSPs by β, there is a
threshold t < β that indicates how many corrupt and
colluding CSPs are tolerated without compromising
security guarantees of the solution. For that reason,
it is important to choose CSPs in a way that they are
not expected to be simultaneously corrupt and col-
luding. For example, one CSP can be maintained by
a professional association and others can come from
competing health networks or cloud service providers.
It is common that t < β/2.
While the general architecture described above, and
demonstrated in Figure 1, allows for fully secure so-
lutions that provably protect all information about
private data, in some cases it is beneficial to employ
more specific configurations to reduce the overhead
of privacy-preserving computation. For the problem
we are addressing, we see two possible configurations
with respect to how the problem is setup and what en-
tities comprise the different categories of participants.
In particular, in the first setting, a number of institu-
tions, each with an insufficient amount of data to draw
robust conclusions about the data set independently,
combine their data sets in privacy-preserving compu-
tation and perform analysis of the joint data set. The
result of the computation (such as the features of the
combined data set) are available to all institutions
who contributed their data sets. In the second case,
one institution with insufficient amount of data seeks
help of other organizations in analyzing medical data.
These other organizations also become data owners
and contribute their data to the computation, but
the result of the computation is revealed only to the
originating party. Because the first setup is of a great
importance and allows for very significant computa-
tional savings compared to the general solutions, we
are going to assume this problem formulation in the
rest of this work. Furthermore, we make an additional
assumption that the set of CSPs is also composed en-
tirely of the participants who learn the result of the
computation. In other words, in this setting the sets
of DOs and ORs are the same and a subset of them
are chosen as CSPs to run the computation on behalf
of the entire group.
3 Example Application
To demonstrate our proposed setup in the actual appli-
cation, we consider the variables assignment problem,
typically referred to as parents assignment problem.12
This problem is a critical component to Bayesian net-
works learning, Markov blankets identification, and
in general, feature selection.12,13 In short, given a set
of variables and a target variable, our task is to select
those variables that best explain the target variable,
based on the input data with the variables’ observa-
tions, and some scoring criterion. We can use the
resulting assignment in multiple ways, for example,
to build classifiers where target variable becomes la-
bel, and its parents are predictors, or more general
machine learning models, like Bayesian networks. We
note that the parents assignment problem is frequently
entangled into biomedical applications, especially in
clinical decision support systems, where classifiers and
probabilistic graphical models are directly constructed
from EHR.
3.1 Problem Statement
Formally, we define the problem as follows. We are
given a set of n variables X = {X1, X2, . . . , Xn},
where each Xi represents one feature of interest. The
features, e.g., age, gender, BMI, medical diagnosis
codes, etc., are selected with respect to the question we
wish to model. For the selected features, we use EHR
to construct a table D of size n×m consisting of m
instances, where each instance represents one patient
(see toy example in Table 1). This table becomes the
input data to evaluate function s(Xi, Pa(Xi)), where
Pa(Xi) represents the currently considered parent set
of Xi. This function quantifies how well variables
in Pa(Xi) ⊆ X − {Xi} explain a target feature Xi.
While there are many ways in which function s can be
constructed,14 in this work we focus on the commonly
used MDL score:15
s(Xi, Pa(Xi)) =
qPa(Xi)∑
j
ri∑
k
(
Nijk × log Nij
Nijk
)
+ nc,
with nc = 0.5× qPa(Xi) × log(m)× (ri − 1). Here, ri
is the number of states (or arity) of Xi, qPa(Xi) =∏
Xj∈Pa(Xi)
rj is the combined number of states that
variables in Pa(Xi) can assume, and Nij and Nijk
are respectively the counts of instances in D such that
variables in Pa(Xi) are in state j, and the counts of
instances such that variables in Pa(Xi) are in state
j and Xi is in state k. For example, consider Ta-
ble 1, and configuration in which Xi denotes T2D,
and Pa(Xi) consists of Sex and Age. Then we have
that qPa(Xi) = 2 × 2, Nij = 2 if j represents assign-
ment Sex = F and Age = [18-45), and if k corresponds
to the state T2D = 1 then Nijk = 1. Note that Nij
and Nijk are dependent on Pa(Xi), but since Pa(Xi)
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Table 1: Example patient data with four features.
` Sex Age Race T2D
1 F [18-45) White 1
1 M [18-45) Asian 0
1 F [45-65) White 0
2 M [45-65) Black 1
2 F [45-65) White 1
2 F [18-45) Black 0
is alway clear from the context we omit it in our
notation.
Intuitively, MDL score uses D to estimate how much
information, expressed by entropy, Pa(Xi) provides
about Xi. To guard against overfitting, it penalizes,
via term nc, models with too many variables. Hav-
ing input data D, scoring criterion s, and feature of
interest Xi, our task is to find set Pa(Xi) for which
s(Xi, Pa(Xi)) is minimized. The resulting set is the
set of parents of Xi.
In this work, we are interested in a variant of the
problem where data D is distributed among several
organizations (i.e. data owners) that jointly wish to
solve the parent assignment. While the organizations
do not want to reveal their data, they cooperate to
agree on the data representation, and on how computa-
tions will be performed. Specifically, the cooperating
organizations decide on how many and which features
should be included in X , and how each feature Xi
should be represented (e.g., how it is encoded, its arity
ri, etc.). For example, in Table 1 age is discretized in
one particular way that must be respected by all data
owners. At the same time, information about how
many instances (e.g., patient records extracted from
EHR) an organization enters into the computation
remains protected. If we denote the number of data
owners by α, then the total number of instances in
D can be represented as m =
α∑
`=1
m(`), where m(`) is
the undisclosed number of instances contributed by
data owner `. For instance, in our example in Table 1
we distinguish α = 2 data owners, each contributing
m(1) = m(2) = 3 data instances. We will denote the
data set maintained by data owner ` by D(`).
3.2 Conventional Algorithm
Before discussing our privacy-preserving approach to
parents assignment on distributed D, we first explain
the standard approach. The general idea is for a given
Algorithm 1 Entropy
Input: Variable Xi, set U
Output: Entropy H(Xi|U)
1: h←
qU∑
j
ri∑
k
(
Nijk × log Nij
Nijk
)
2: return h
Xi to consider and evaluate s for all possible candidate
parent sets of growing size, starting from empty set.
In practice, it is advantageous to consider slightly
extended version of the problem.13 Suppose that
instead of selecting parents of Xi from X − {Xi}, we
consider only some subset U ⊆ X − {Xi} of variables.
If the set U has the property that its score s(Xi, U)
is lower than the score of any of its subsets, that is
∀U ′⊂U s(Xi, U) < s(Xi, U ′), we will call it a maximal
parent set. In other words, if U is a maximal parent
set, then all variables in U are optimal parents of Xi.
It turns out that by computing and storing all maximal
parent sets of Xi in X −{Xi} we can efficiently select
optimal parents of Xi from any subset of X − {Xi}.
This property is very practical and directly applicable
in efficient learning of Bayesian networks. Hence, in
Algorithms 1 and 2 we summarize the procedure to
enumerate all maximal parent sets for Xi.
Algorithm 1 outlines a helper procedure to estimate
conditional entropy of Xi given some set of variables U .
The algorithm depends on counts Nij and Nijk, which
in the conventional approach are extracted from D
using some fast counting method, for example.16 To
perform enumeration, in Algorithm 2, we organize all
possible subsets of X −{Xi} into a subset lattice. We
explore the lattice by performing breadth first search
traversal, starting from empty set (lines 2–4) and then
considering subsets of increasing size. Here we use Q
to denote the list of subsets processed at the current
layer of the lattice, and Q′ to denote the list of subsets
that should be processed at the next layer. For each
considered subset U , we evaluate scoring function s,
in this case MDL (lines 13–14), which we next use to
decide whether U is a maximal parent set. Specifically,
if s improves over the lowest score s′ among all strict
subsets of U , then U is a maximal parent set, and
hence we should retain it in the output structure PGi
together with the score s (lines 18–19).
To eliminate from consideration subsets that cannot
be maximal parent sets, and hence reduce computa-
tional complexity of the traversal, we exploit theo-
retical bounds on MDL score. Without going into
details, which are available in,13,17 we set the bound
w based on the minimal possible conditional entropy
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Algorithm 2 MaximalParentSets
Input: Variable Xi, threshold lmax
Output: Maximal parent set structure PGi
1: H = Entropy(Xi,X − {Xi})
2: Q← ∅
3: s← Entropy(Xi, ∅)
4: PGi.insert((s, ∅))
5: Q′ ← {{X1}, . . . , {Xi−1}, {Xi+1}, . . . , {Xn}}
6: l← 1
7: while (Q′ 6= ∅) ∧ (l ≤ lmax) do
8: Q← Q′
9: Q′ ← ∅
10: B ← ∅
11: for U ∈ Q do
12: N ← {U ∪ {Xj}|Xj ∈ X − {Xi} − U}
13: nc← 0.5× qU × log(m)× (ri − 1)
14: s← nc+Entropy(Xi, U)
15: s′ ← BestSubset(PGi, U)
16: w ← nc+H
17: if s′ ≤ w then
18: if s < s′ then
19: PGi.insert((s, U))
20: Q′ ← Q′ ∪N
21: else
22: B ← B ∪N
23: if B 6= ∅ then
24: Q′ ← Q′ −B
25: l← l + 1
26: return PGi
of Xi, and penalty term nc (line 16). If the considered
subset U cannot improve over the bound, none of its
supersets (represented by N) can improve, and hence
they should be removed from further consideration.
Moreover, for a set in N to be considered in the next
layer, all it subsets must satisfy the bound w. We
enforce this by maintaining set B of all subsets that
should not be processed in subsequent steps (lines 22–
24). Finally, we note that instead of considering all
possible subsets, the entire enumeration process can
be limited only to subsets with cardinality smaller
than some predefined threshold lmax. This threshold
can be selected based on D, such that the entire algo-
rithm remains exact, or it can be configured based on
some prior information.
4 Securing Computations
Privacy-preserving computation over distributed data
is often called secure (multi-party) computation in the
security and cryptography literature. For that reason,
we might use the term secure computation to mean
privacy-preserving computation.
When the dataset is distributed across multiple sites,
it needs to be combined prior to being used in the
computation. Because privacy-preserving computa-
tion on protected data always incurs higher costs than
an equivalent computation on locally available un-
protected data, we want to minimize the portion of
the computation that operates on protected data. To
lower the overhead of our solution, we employ two
crucial optimizations. First, each data owner locally
pre-processes its data prior to inputting it into the
computation. This allows us to eliminate most of
the expensive joint privacy-preserving computation
on the combined data set. Second, the information
that the participants will learn as part of the output
can be opened, i.e. represented without cryptographic
protection, as soon as it becomes available at an inter-
mediate step of the computation. As this data does
need to be protected, it can be used directly further
speeding up computation. This idea was also the basis
of optimizations in18 and in many cases was shown
to have significant impact on performance. In this
work, we realize the first idea by having each data
owner to locally pre-compute all Nijs and Nijks using
their locally available data sets. That is, data owner
` pre-computes N (`)ij s and N
(`)
ijks using its local D(`).
The computation for determining the values of Nijs
and Nijks is expensive because it requires repeated
access to the entire table D. This means that if the
parties instead enter their D(`)’s into the joint compu-
tation, compute combined D and consequently Nijs
and Nijks, the secure computation will incur a large
runtime. However, if each DO locally computes N (`)ij s
and N (`)ijks and enters them into the joint computa-
tion, the combined values can be reconstructed inside
secure computation very efficiently as Nij =
α∑
`=1
N
(`)
ij
and Nijk =
α∑
`=1
N
(`)
ijk.
Before we proceed any further, let us identify portions
of the algorithms that handle private data. Recall
that the number of variables n as well as the number
of values that each variable Xi can take, ri, need to
be agreed upon ahead of time and are public. The
data itself, including the number of observations in
each dataset, is private. This means that the number
of observations in the combined data set, m, must be
treated as private as well. To ensure the strongest
possible data protection, any value that depends on
a private data item needs to be considered private
throughout the computation.
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Consider Algorithm 2. The input arguments, i.e. vari-
able Xi and threshold lmax, are open, while the con-
tent of table D must remain protected. The algorithm
considers different possibilities for parent sets, and in
the beginning the content of sets Q and Q′ is known.
The set Q is subsequently updated based on the con-
tent of sets Q′ and B, the computation of which
depends on private data. This is because the contents
of Q′ and B depend on the condition on line 17 that
involves entropy H, which is private (i.e., computed
using the data from D). This means that the set of U
possibilities after the first iteration of the while loop
needs to be treated as private and therefore all data
(except l) in the remaining computation needs to be
treated as private as well.
The above has significant implications on performance.
For example, we need to execute the maximum number
of for loop iterations to protect the size of Q and
hide the fact whether insertion takes place on line 19
by always inserting a record into PGi (real or fake).
Furthermore, because the candidate parent sets U
tested by Algorithm 2 are now private, performance
of Algorithm 1 is also affected. In particular, qU
and ri become protected, which requires the sums
to be executed over the largest possible number of
terms. In addition, the algorithm needs to privately
retrieve the values of Nij and Nijk without revealing
what values have been accessed (i.e., by touching all
possible values in D, or by employing more complex
randomized techniques). This means that executing
the algorithm on private data results in significant
performance degradation.
Now consider the setting where the computational
parties are also output recipients, and thus they are
entitled to observing the content of PGi. Note that
once it is determined that a parent set needs to be
added to PGi, it will remain in that data structure.
Hence, once a pair (s, U) is added to PGi, it can be
opened (because it will be part of the output), but
the corresponding s′ should remain private.
If we would like to maintain the structure and effi-
ciency of the algorithm, we need to know what sets U
proceed to the next algorithm iteration (stored in Q′).
If we reveal this information, this provides informa-
tion about the outcomes of condition s′ ≤ w. Then
because the values of s′ and nc might be guessable,
the outcome of comparison s′ ≤ w reveals the lower
bound of entropy H, which can be consequently used
to narrow down the value of H, defined as the amount
of uncertainly that variable Xi contributes to the set.
Note, however, that this is a very limited amount
of information that one can learn about the entire
data set (and not about individual records that com-
pose the dataset because this is a one-way irreversible
computation). Furthermore, entropy computed on
individual data sets D(`) that the data owners con-
tribute to the computation is expected to be similar
to that of the combined set D. Lastly, as the goal of
the overall joint computation is to learn conditional
dependencies between different variables, similar in-
formation is already a part of the output. Thus, this
is an insignificant amount of leakage that does not re-
veal information about sensitive data and we allow it
in order to maintain the structure of the computation
and the algorithm’s efficiency.
To improve performance of privacy-preserving com-
putation, we use non-traditional implementation of
certain functions. For example, the logarithm func-
tion is expensive to compute on private data and
it is executed multiple times in each invocation of
Algorithm 1. The division operation, and in general
operators involving non-integer values, is non-trivial as
well. Thus we replace the computation log(Nij/Nijk)
in Algorithm 1 with log(Nij)− log(Nijk). Now note
that each input in the logarithm function is a small
integer between 0 and m. This means that we can
pre-compute the logarithm function for all integers
in the range and store them in an array. Then evalu-
ating the logarithm function on private Nij or Nijk
will amount to retrieving one value of the array at
a private location. We devise an optimized solution
for reading an element of an array at a private lo-
cation for the purposes of this work, because of the
frequency with which this function will be called in
our algorithm.
5 Discussion
The ability to compute on distributed medical data
is critical to advancing the use of ML techniques in
health informatics. It is of special importance in cases
like rare diseases, where the existing data is already
very sparse, or when available data is imbalanced.
With our platform, we make it possible to compute
directly on distributed data, without ever exposing
or modifying it. One way to think about the plat-
form is as computing on encrypted data, where the
encryption key is distributed (i.e. partitioned) be-
tween participants. This has the effect of completely
preserving privacy of the patients described by the
data, while maintaining the original utility of the data
(as long as the participants do not collude to recon-
struct the complete encryption key). Consequently,
the platform can be directly used to build or train
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ML models that otherwise would be impossible to
achieve. As the access to the data remains one of the
major impediments in medical applications of ML,19
the platform could of direct use to researchers and
practitioners alike.
Although we presented the platform in the context of
one specific ML problem applied to categorized medi-
cal data, we note that the approach is generalizable.
In fact, privacy-preserving computation is possible via
generic techniques for any desired functionality, and
specific constructs have been provided in the context
of GWAS studies,20 DNA sequences comparisons,21,22
and disease risk computation,23 among others. How-
ever, we note that the transformation of standard algo-
rithms into their privacy-preserving equivalents may
be non-trivial, even if assisted by a dedicated com-
piler.19 Moreover, the resulting privacy-preserving
realization will be usually significantly slower than
its standard counterpart. However, the platform is
scalable in the number of participating sites, including
both data owners and computational service providers.
Specifically, the efficiency of the platform is typi-
cally not affected by the number of data owners, and
thus can be easily expanded with potential new data
sources. At the same time, the number of computa-
tional service providers may stay fixed, as long as it
satisfies the threshold for the number of non-colluding
providers. This has a practical implication for estab-
lishing a platform, since it is sufficient to include only
a few computational service providers.
References
[1] I. Kononenko. Machine learning for medical di-
agnosis: History, state of the art and perspective.
Artificial Intelligence in Medicine, 23(1):89–109,
2001.
[2] H.M. Krumholz. Big data and new knowledge
in medicine: The thinking, training, and tools
needed for a learning health system. Health Af-
fairs, 33(7):1163–1170, jul 2014.
[3] H. Shin and M.K. Markey. A machine learning
perspective on the development of clinical deci-
sion support systems utilizing mass spectra of
blood samples. Journal of Biomedical Informat-
ics, 39(2):227–248, 2006.
[4] I. Lipkovich, A. Dmitrienko, and R.B.
D’Agostino. Tutorial in biostatistics: Data-
driven subgroup identification and analysis
in clinical trials. Statistics in Medicine,
36(1):136–196, 2017.
[5] C. Turvey and J. Fortney. The use of telemedicine
and mobile technology to promote population
health and population management for psychi-
atric disorders. Current Psychiatry Reports,
19(11):88, 2017.
[6] H. MacLeod, S. Yang, K. Oakes, K. Connelly,
and S. Natarajan. Identifying rare diseases from
behavioural data: A machine learning approach.
In IEEE International Conference on Connected
Health: Applications, Systems and Engineering
Technologies (CHASE), pages 130–139, 2016.
[7] D. Baumer, J.B. Earp, and F.C. Payton. Privacy
of medical records: IT implications of HIPAA.
ACM SIGCAS Computers and Society, 30:40–47,
2000.
[8] M.J. Steinberg and E.R. Rubin. The HIPAA
privacy rule: Lacks patient benefit, impedes re-
search growth. Technical report, Association of
Academic Health Centers.
[9] K. Benitez, G. Loukides, and B. Malin. Beyond
safe harbor: Automatic discovery of health infor-
mation de-identification policy alternatives. In
ACM International Conference on Health Infor-
matics (IHI), 2010.
[10] C. Dwork. Differential privacy. In International
Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Pro-
gramming (ICALP), pages 1–12, 2006.
[11] O. Goldreich. Foundations of Cryptography: Vol-
ume 2, Basic Applications. Cambridge University
Press, 2009.
[12] M. Koivisto. Parent assignment is hard for the
MDL, AIC, and NML costs. In International
Conference on Computational Learning Theory,
pages 289–303, 2006.
[13] S. Karan and J. Zola. Scalable exact parent sets
identification in Bayesian networks learning with
Apache Spark. In IEEE International Confer-
ence on High Performance Computing, Data, and
Analytics (HiPC), pages 33–41, 2017.
[14] M.L. de Campos. A scoring function for learning
Bayesian networks based on mutual information
and conditional independence tests. Journal of
Machine Learning Research, 7:2149–2187, 2001.
[15] G. Schwarz. Estimating the dimension of a model.
The Annals of Statistics, 6:461–464, 1978.
7
[16] S. Karan, M. Eichhorn, B. Hurlburt, G. Iraci, and
J. Zola. Fast counting in machine learning appli-
cations. In Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
(UAI), 2018.
[17] J. Tian. A branch-and-bound algorithm for MDL
learning Bayesian networks. In Uncertainty in Ar-
tificial Intelligence (UAI), pages 580–588, 2000.
[18] F. Kerschbaum. Automatically optimizing secure
computation. In ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security (CCS), pages 703–
714, 2011.
[19] Y. Zhang, A. Steele, and M. Blanton. Picco: A
general-purpose compiler for private distributed
computation. In ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security (CCS), pages 813–
826, 2013.
[20] A. Shahbazi, F. Bayatbabolghani, and M. Blan-
ton. Private computation with genomic data for
genome-wide association and linkage studies. In
International Workshop on Genomic Privacy and
Security (GenoPri), 2016.
[21] E. Ayday, J.L. Raisaro, U. Hengartner,
A. Molyneaux, and J.-P. Hubaux. Privacy-
preserving processing of raw genomic data. In
Data Privacy Management and Autonomous
Spontaneous Security (DMP/SETOP), pages 133–
147, 2014.
[22] Y. Zhang, M. Blanton, and G. Almashaqbeh. Se-
cure distributed genome analysis for GWAS and
sequence comparison computation. BMC Medical
Informatics and Decision Making Journal, 15(5),
2015.
[23] E. Ayday, J.L. Raisaro, M. Laren, P. Jack, J. Fel-
lay, and J.P. Hubaux. Privacy-preserving compu-
tation of disease risk by using genomic, clinical,
and environmental data. In USENIX Security
Workshop on Health Information Technologies
(HealthTech), 2013.
8
